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THE SECOND CIRCUIT
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
Matthew Diller* & Alexander A. Reinert**
INTRODUCTION
The Second Circuit is renowned for its landmark rulings in fields such as
white collar crime and securities law—bread and butter issues growing out
of Wall Street’s preeminence in the financial landscape of the nation. At
the same time, the Second Circuit has a long tradition of breaking new
ground on issues of social justice. Unlike some circuit courts which have
reputations in the area of social justice built around one or two fields, such
as the Fifth Circuit’s pioneering role in civil rights litigation1 or the Ninth
Circuit’s focus on immigration,2 there is no one area of social justice
litigation that could be considered the Second Circuit’s signature issue.
Instead, it has issued key decisions and established important lines of cases
in a wide range of subjects.
Moreover the Second Circuit has developed these bodies of law, for the
most part, in its own distinctive incremental manner. The circuit has long
operated through consensus, with little of the Sturm und Drang that have
accompanied en banc reviews and fiery dissents that are common in some
other courts of appeals.3 Indeed, the Second Circuit’s tradition and practice
of disfavoring en banc review in favor of awaiting guidance from the U.S.

* Dean and Paul Fuller Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Dean Diller
is grateful for the assistance of Brianna Gallo, Miranda Lievsay, Brandon Ruben, and Emily
Vance in the research and preparation of this Article. He wishes to acknowledge the great
debt he owes to the late Honorable Walter R. Mansfield for whom he clerked in the 1985–86
term of the Second Circuit and whose mentorship has played a critical role in his career.
** Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. Professor Reinert expresses his
thanks and gratitude to Francesca Acocella and Vinodh Jayaraman, who provided
indispensable research assistance on this project.
1. “The Fifth Circuit’s Four” were comprised of four legendary judges in the 1950s and
1960s who played a major role in ending Jim Crow in the South. See generally JACK BASS,
UNLIKELY HEROES (1981).
2. See ANNA O. LAW, THE IMMIGRATION BATTLE IN AMERICAN COURTS 144–87 (2010)
(studying the Ninth Circuit’s role in the immigration system).
3. See Mario Lucero, Note, The Second Circuit’s En Banc Crisis, 2013 CARDOZO L.
REV. DE NOVO 32, 36–42, http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/LUCERO_
2013_32.pdf (noting that between 2000 and 2010, the Second Circuit heard eight cases en
banc, about half the number heard by the next highest circuit) [https://perma.cc/VV7EUYZ9].
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Supreme Court has long been a matter of interest to commentators and
courts alike.4
The Second Circuit’s strong tradition in social justice litigation is, in part,
a reflection of the richness of the legal community in the New York City
metropolitan area and the vibrancy of urban life in the geographic
boundaries of the circuit.5 New York City is the home of many major
national public interest organizations, including the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Legal
Momentum (formerly NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund), vibrant
local organizations focused on civil rights and legal services for lowincome clients, and small public interest law firms focused on civil rights
and allied litigation. These public interest organizations draw on the rich
community of the nineteen law schools within the circuit and are
supplemented by the robust pro bono traditions of the major law firms. In
addition, federal, state, and local government law offices in the circuit have
a well-established tradition of affirmative litigation.
This Article highlights just a few areas of law as illustrations of the
Second Circuit’s jurisprudence in dealing with claims of marginalized and
subordinated individuals and groups. In the area of civil rights, this Article
focuses on sexual harassment law and prisoners’ rights. In the area of
public benefits, this Article focuses on public assistance and the disability
benefit programs of the Social Security Act. The discussion of public
assistance will focus on one blockbuster case, Goldberg v. Kelly.6 These
are just some examples of the circuit’s social justice jurisprudence that has
developed over several decades.
Any attempt to account for the Second Circuit’s jurisprudence in social
justice in just a short essay will, of necessity, be vastly incomplete. For
instance, while this Article focuses on more recent opinions, there are some
earlier Second Circuit opinions in the areas of immigration,7 due process,8

4. See id.; see also Wilfred Feinberg, Unique Customs and Practices of the Second
Circuit, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 297, 311–12 (1986); James Oakes, Personal Reflections on
Learned Hand and the Second Circuit, 47 STAN. L. REV. 387, 392–93 (1995). Compare
Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 88, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2008) (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting) (dissenting
from the denial of rehearing en banc and criticizing reliance on the court’s “tradition” of
denying en banc review), with id. at 89–90 (Katzmann, J., concurring) (“Throughout our
history, we have proceeded to a full hearing en banc only in rare and exceptional
circumstances.”).
5. This observation is not intended to denigrate the outstanding social justice oriented
law practices in Connecticut and Vermont, as well as elsewhere in New York State.
6. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
7. See Soo Hoo Yee v. United States, 3 F.2d 592, 597 (2d Cir. 1924) (recognizing that
a Chinese person born in the United States “well understood the difficulty he would
encounter in establishing his right to enter the country” and therefore excusing his entry to
the United States in a manner indicating a “desire to escape the observation of the inspection
officers with whom he thought he might have trouble”); United States ex rel. Haum Pon v.
Sisson, 230 F. 974, 976 (2d Cir. 1916) (rejecting the claim that an individual should be
deported to China simply because of his appearance, and noting that “[i]n the present
age . . . it is impossible to tell by the mere inspection of a man where he was born or from
whence he came”).
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and civil rights9 that undoubtedly made their mark at the time. And even
though this Article concentrates on cases from the mid- to late twentieth
century to the present, we lack both the space and the time to expound on
significant recent decisions in the areas of national security,10 disability
rights,11 children’s rights,12 and discrimination on the basis of race13 or
sexuality,14 among others. Additionally, outside of its decisions, the court
has taken other significant steps in areas such as immigration.15 We lack
8. See United States ex rel. Jelic v. Dist. Dir. of Immigration & Naturalization, 106
F.2d 14, 19 (2d Cir. 1939) (finding that the examining inspector at an immigration hearing
failed to provide a fair hearing to a noncitizen seeking admission to the United States);
Angelus v. Sullivan, 246 F. 54, 62–64 (2d Cir. 1917) (holding that habeas corpus may issue
to a local conscription board where an individual claiming exemption from military service
has been denied a full and fair hearing).
9. See Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways, 229 F.2d 499, 501–02 (2d Cir. 1956)
(finding that section 484(b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 implicitly created a cause
of action for racial discrimination against passengers by airlines); United States ex rel. Lynn
v. Downer, 140 F.2d 397, 401–03 (2d Cir. 1944) (Clark, J., dissenting) (arguing that separate
selective service quotas for African American and white men were inconsistent with
statutory law and equal protection doctrine).
10. See, e.g., Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, 237 (2d Cir. 2015) (en banc)
(recognizing the availability of a Bivens action for post-September 11 detainees); ACLU v.
Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 821 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that the National Security Agency’s
collection of telephone metadata exceeded authority granted by the Federal Intelligence
Surveillance Act); John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 882–83 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding
that provisions regarding National Security Letters violated the First Amendment).
11. See, e.g., Disabled in Action v. Bd. of Elections of N.Y., 752 F.3d 189, 199–200 (2d
Cir. 2014) (holding that the Board of Elections denied meaningful access to its voting
program to people with vision and mobility disabilities); Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331
F.3d 261, 290 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding injunctive relief against New York City for
residents with acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) or HIV-related illnesses);
Soc’y for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1250 (2d Cir.
1984) (finding that an individual with mental retardation has due process right to “training
sufficient to prevent basic self-care skills from deteriorating” in order to maintain liberty
interest in a decent and humane existence).
12. See, e.g., Doe v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 790 (2d Cir. 1983)
(establishing substantive due process duty of care for children in foster care); Rivera v.
Marcus, 696 F.2d 1016, 1024–25 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that a relative licensed as a foster
parent has protected liberty interest in the integrity of her family).
13. The circuit’s housing discrimination jurisprudence, for example, looms large. See,
e.g., Ragin v. N.Y. Times, 923 F.2d 995, 1000 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that the exclusive use
of white models in real estate advertisements can violate the Fair Housing Act); Huntington
Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 933 (2d Cir.) (holding that litigation
under the Fair Housing Act is subject to disparate impact analysis), aff’d, 488 U.S. 15
(1988); United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1103 (2d Cir. 1988) (rejecting
the use of racial quotas in housing as a means of maintaining racial balance); United States
v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1184 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming a finding of
intentional discrimination in housing and education); see also Glenn W. Falk, Housing
Discrimination Law, 14 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 593, 593 (1994) (outlining “the list of powerful
Second Circuit opinions analyzing far-reaching claims of racial segregation in housing”).
14. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 184–85 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying heightened
scrutiny to classifications based on sexuality), aff’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013).
15. For instance, with Chief Judge Robert Katzmann’s encouragement and assistance,
law firms, nonprofit organizations, immigration groups, bar associations, law schools, and
federal, state, and local governments have focused attention on access to counsel for
immigrants in the service of fair and effective administration of justice in immigration
proceedings. See generally Robert A. Katzmann, Innovative Approaches to Immigrant
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the space to address here the depth of the Second Circuit’s impact in these
and many other areas of importance to social justice movements. The areas
we highlight, however, reflect the Second Circuit’s considered and nuanced
approach to the difficult questions that courts encounter every day in these
areas. We hope that in so doing, we have given a picture, albeit incomplete,
that does justice to the Second Circuit’s tradition and history.
I. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S LEADING ROLE
IN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
New York City has long been home to some of the leading nonprofit
organizations active in antidiscrimination challenges, including the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Lambda Legal, Legal Momentum, and the ACLU, not to mention small
public interest law firms that regularly litigate employment discrimination
and civil rights claims. Although many of these groups litigate across the
country, they also have brought challenges to policies and practices of local
public and private institutions.16 Thus, it should be no surprise that
significant opinions in the area of antidiscrimination law emerged from the
Second Circuit.
This part focuses on the Second Circuit’s sexual harassment
jurisprudence. As a general matter, discrimination is a function of power
dynamics that are pervasive throughout social institutions, including
courts.17 The problem of sexual harassment in the workplace is just one
Representation: Exploring New Partnerships, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 331 (2011); Robert A.
Katzmann, Deepening the Legal Profession’s Pro Bono Commitment to the Immigrant Poor,
78 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2009); Kirk Semple, Seeking Better Legal Help for Immigrants,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/nyregion/service-programwill-recruit-law-school-graduates-to-help-represent-immigrants.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
ZPP4-BYVD].
16. See, e.g., United States v. City of New York, 359 F.3d 83, 97 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding
that public welfare recipients obliged to participate in New York City’s Work Experience
Program are employees within the meaning of Title VII and are entitled to Title VII’s
protections against sexual and racial harassment); Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775, 784–85
(2d Cir. 1994) (discussing plaintiffs’ class action alleging racial discrimination and
segregation in public housing and assistance programs in Erie County, New York); Ragin v.
Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898, 902–03 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing plaintiffs’
complaint alleging discriminatory advertising in violation of the Fair Housing Act);
Waisome v. Port Auth., 999 F.2d 711, 712 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing the claim in a
consolidated class action that the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey’s promotional
examinations had disparate impacts on black officers in violation of Title VII); Wilder v.
Bernstein, 848 F.2d 1338, 1341 (2d Cir. 1988) (addressing the claim that New York City’s
statutory scheme for provision of child care services violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution); Hispanic Soc’y of N.Y.C. Police Dep’t Inc. v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 806
F.2d 1147, 1150–51 (2d Cir. 1986) (involving a challenge to the sergeants’ examination
administered by the New York City Police Department), aff’d sub nom. Marino v. Ortiz, 484
U.S. 301 (1988); Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134, 136 (2d Cir. 1978) (addressing an
allegation of intentional segregation by the Buffalo school system); Vulcan Soc’y of N.Y.C.
Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 490 F.2d 387, 390 (2d Cir. 1973) (involving
a challenge to the employment practices of the New York City Fire Department).
17. See Elise C. Boddie, Adaptive Discrimination, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1235, 1240–41
(2016) (presenting the theory that racial discrimination is a complex, adaptive system that
persists through “ostensibly race-neutral institutional rules, laws, and behaviors”); Susan K.
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example.18 As Joanna Grossman has suggested, sexual harassment law has
developed over three eras: (1) the emergence of consciousness in the
1970s; (2) the development of a theoretical and doctrinal understanding of
harassment as discrimination in the 1980s and 1990s; and (3) the more
recent critiques from those who claim that the law now regulates too much
interpersonal conduct, as well as those who claim that the law insufficiently
deters or compensates for the harms of harassment.19 As this Article
discusses, the Second Circuit played a significant role in this evolution, and,
although this Article highlights only a few of the most important cases, the
Second Circuit overall has embraced a nuanced understanding of
discrimination in the workplace that goes above and beyond sexual
harassment.
While abuse and harassment of a sexual nature has existed for centuries,
the recognition that such harassment could be actionable at law did not
emerge until after 1964 with the passage of Title VII.20 Initially, courts did
not appreciate that workplace sexual harassment could constitute
discrimination in employment on the basis of sex. For example, according
to one judge in the District of Arizona, pervasive harassment was simply “a
personal proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism” in which the supervisor “was
satisfying a personal urge.”21 A judge in the District of New Jersey adopted
this same logic in the 1976 case of Tomkins v. Public Service Electric &
Gas Co.,22 in which an employee alleged that her supervisor had invited her
to lunch, made “sexual advances,” and ultimately demoted and fired her
after she had complained about the incident.23 For judges like these,

Hippensteele, Revisiting the Promise of Mediation for Employment Discrimination Claims, 9
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 211, 221–23 (2009) (describing the inability of traditional dispute
resolution mechanisms to adequately redress employment discrimination); Susan Sturm,
Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 458, 460 (2001) (characterizing “second generation” discrimination as involving
“social practices,” “patterns of interaction,” and “[s]tructures of decisionmaking,
opportunity, and power”).
18. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a
Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 93
(2003) (“[W]e can have little hope of transforming existing power differentials without an
adequate conceptualization of the modern forms of discrimination that is independent from,
though naturally coexistent with, prevailing conceptions of workplace discrimination.”);
Linda S. Greene, Sexual Harassment Law and the First Amendment, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
729, 740 (1995) (discussing the presence of group power dynamics in sexual harassment);
Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2172 (2003) (contextualizing
sexual harassment in “larger structures of gender inequality in which genuine sex harassment
flourishes”).
19. Joanna L. Grossman, Moving Forward, Looking Back: A Retrospective on Sexual
Harassment Law, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1029, 1030–31 (2015).
20. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
21. Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562
F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977). On July 19, 2016, Professor Reinert, a coauthor of this Article, had
a conversation with Heather Sigworth, the plaintiff’s attorney in Corne, in which he learned
that the case was settled after remand.
22. 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev’d, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
23. Id. at 557.
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applying Title VII to such conduct was “ludicrous” and would force
employers to only hire people “who were asexual.”24
Judicial reluctance to apply Title VII to sexual harassment in the
workplace operated on four levels. On one level, resistance was based on a
narrative about the fundamental urges of sex. As the judge from the
District of New Jersey put it in Tomkins, Title VII was not meant to
“provide a federal tort remedy for what amounts to physical attack
motivated by sexual desire on the part of a supervisor and which happened
to occur in a corporate corridor rather than a back alley.”25 In other words,
courts reasoned that because the law could not be shoehorned to intervene
in “natural” social relations, the fact that the behavior occurs in an
employment context should not place it under the umbrella of Title VII. On
another level, resistance flowed from a misreading of what constituted
discrimination on the basis of sex. Early on, courts reasoned that because
the gender of each person is “incidental to the claim of abuse,” it cannot be
discrimination on account of sex, but simply an encounter in which “sexual
desire animated the parties, or at least one of them.”26 Third, reluctance
rested on various concerns about a flood of new claims that could be raised
under Title VII: (1) that coworkers who claim that they were disfavored as
a result of a woman “accepting” sexual advances by a supervisor might
bring suit alleging discrimination and (2) that sexual harassment itself is so
common that too many claims would be filed if Title VII was viewed as
covering harassment.27 Finally, resistance also stemmed from a desire to
avoid disrupting social conventions:
“The attraction of males to females and females to males is a natural sex
phenomenon and it is probable that this attraction plays at least a subtle
part in most personnel decisions.” This natural sexual attraction can be
subtle. If the plaintiff’s view were to prevail, no superior could,
prudently, attempt to open a social dialogue with any subordinate of either
sex. An invitation to dinner could become an invitation to a federal
lawsuit if a once harmonious relationship turned sour at some later time.28

Courts within the Second Circuit were not immune to this kind of
thinking. A District of Connecticut judge cited Tomkins for the proposition
that a female employee could not establish a Title VII violation where she

24. Corne, 390 F. Supp. at 163–64.
25. Tomkins, 422 F. Supp. at 556.
26. Id. Even in reversing the district court’s decision in Tomkins, the Third Circuit
crafted a dividing line between “complaints alleging sexual advances of an individual or
personal nature and those alleging direct employment consequences flowing from the
advances, finding Title VII violations in the latter category.” Tomkins, 568 F.2d at 1048.
27. See Tomkins, 422 F. Supp. at 556–57 (“The abuse of authority by supervisors of
either sex for personal purposes is an unhappy and recurrent feature of our social
experience. . . . And if an inebriated approach by a supervisor to a subordinate at the office
Christmas party could form the basis of a federal lawsuit for sex discrimination if a
promotion or a raise is later denied to the subordinate, we would need 4,000 federal trial
judges instead of some 400.”).
28. Id. at 557 (quoting Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976)).
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complained that a male employee had “once pinched her breast and on
another occasion invited her to bed.”29
The Second Circuit, however, soon demonstrated an appropriate level of
sensitivity to similar allegations. For example, in the 1989 case Carrero v.
New York City Housing Authority,30 the defendants argued that “trivial
behavior,” including kisses, arm strokes, “degrading epithets” and “other
objectionable” conduct, was insufficiently pervasive to constitute a hostile
work environment.31 Judge Richard Cardamone, writing for the court,
“emphatically reject[ed] this argument” because an employee “need not
subject herself to an extended period of demeaning and degrading
provocation before being entitled to seek the remedies provided under Title
VII.”32
In deciding Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Center, Inc.33 in 1992,
the Second Circuit extended protection against retaliation to an employee
who was subjected to an adverse employment decision for making an
internal complaint protesting against sexual harassment.34 The court
recognized that Title VII should protect employees who express opposition
to sexual harassment, even if they had not filed a formal Title VII or Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) complaint.35 The court
also recognized that employers should not be able to avoid Title VII
liability where they promptly respond to a complaint of sexual harassment,
but the response has all indications of a “sham.”36
The Second Circuit continued its trajectory in a significant sexual
harassment case decided in 1994. In Karibian v. Columbia University,37
the plaintiff alleged that her supervisor forced her into a violent sexual
relationship, in return for which she received promotions and pay
increases.38 The significance of Karibian, and what distinguished it from
most “quid pro quo harassment cases”39 that had come before it, was that, at
least for a period of time, the plaintiff experienced promotions and pay
increases as a result of her sexual relations with her supervisor rather than

29. Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., No. B-74-251, 1976 WL 22169, at *4 (D. Conn. June
11, 1976).
30. 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989).
31. Id. at 578.
32. Id.
33. 957 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1992).
34. See id. at 65.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 64. In Kotcher, there was evidence of a sham because the defendant’s only
“punishment” of the alleged harasser was transfer to a different store where he soon was
promoted to his previous position. See id. This reaction to the complaint tended to indicate
that the defendant “at least tolerated [the employee’s] unlawful harassing conduct.” Id.
37. 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1994).
38. See id. at 775–76.
39. The phrase “quid pro quo harassment case(s)” is used throughout this Article to refer
to cases in which a supervisor suggests that he or she will provide a benefit to an employee
in exchange for that employee’s satisfaction of a sexual demand.

80

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

being subjected to detrimental conditions because of a refusal to engage in
sexual relations.40
Judge Joseph McLaughlin’s opinion summarized the plaintiff’s account
as follows:
In 1987, while a student in Columbia University’s General Studies
Program, Sharon Karibian worked in Columbia’s fundraising “Telefund”
office. . . . In September 1987, Columbia appointed defendant Mark
Urban as Development Officer for Annual Giving at [University
Development and Alumni Relations]. In that capacity, Urban had
supervisory authority over Telefund, and, consequently, over
Karibian . . . . [According to Karibian,] Urban “pursued” Karibian by
repeatedly inviting her out to bars, ostensibly to discuss work-related
matters. On those occasions, Urban often asked Karibian back to his
apartment. Initially, Karibian rebuffed Urban’s advances; ultimately,
however, she yielded to pressure from Urban. Specifically, Karibian
claimed that Urban coerced her into a violent sexual relationship by
telling her that she “owed him” for all he was doing for her as her
supervisor.
Karibian also claimed that the conditions of her
employment—including her raises, hours, autonomy and flexibility—
varied from time to time, depending on her responsiveness to Urban.
Karibian stated that she believed she would be fired if she did not give in
to Urban’s demands.41

The plaintiff at first did not tell anyone about the nature of her
relationship with Urban, but in September 1988 she contacted Columbia’s
Panel on Sexual Harassment and also met with Columbia’s Equal
Opportunity Coordinator.42 According to Karibian, individuals from each
office “discouraged her from actively pursuing a complaint against Urban”
and Karibian requested that the meetings be kept confidential.43
Approximately one and a half years later, Karibian again met with
Columbia’s Equal Opportunity Coordinator; this time, however, she did not
insist on confidentiality.44 Columbia University ultimately forced Urban to
resign “for reasons that remain somewhat vague” and laid off Karibian after
the office where she worked was closed.45
Although the parties sharply disputed the facts (Urban maintained that
the sexual relations were consensual), the legal issue was significant:
whether a plaintiff can bring a Title VII claim for sexual harassment when
she suffered no economic harm as a result of the harassment.46 Columbia
University successfully argued before the district court that, because the
plaintiff had suffered no economic harm, she could not bring a claim

40. See Karibian, 14 F.3d at 775–76. The plaintiff also alleged, however, that she
suffered retaliation after she terminated the relationship. See Karibian v. Columbia Univ.,
930 F. Supp. 134, 140–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
41. Karibian, 14 F.3d at 775–76.
42. See id. at 776.
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 775.
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regarding the sexual harassment she claimed to experience.47 The district
court also held that the plaintiff could not establish a hostile work
environment claim against Columbia University because it did not have
sufficient notice of Urban’s conduct and took reasonable steps in response
to Karibian’s harassment complaints.48
The Second Circuit reversed the district court on both grounds, using
reasoning that was noteworthy at the time.49 First, the court addressed
Karibian’s quid pro quo claim, holding that neither the language of Title
VII nor relevant EEOC regulations required plaintiffs to provide evidence
of economic harm to prevail.50 Instead, to establish a quid pro quo claim,
the plaintiff was required to show (1) that she was subject to unwelcome
sexual conduct and (2) “that her reaction to that conduct was then used as
the basis for decisions affecting the compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges of her employment.”51 Although the Second Circuit cited
authority from other courts for its general statement of the law, the law was
quite uncertain at the time.52 The three cases relied upon by the circuit, for
instance, all involved instances of “classic” quid pro quo harassment in
which the plaintiff suffered tangible harm to the terms and conditions of her
47. See id. at 776.
48. See id. at 777. At the time, the difference under the law between quid pro quo
harassment claims and hostile work environment claims was significant because an
employer was strictly liable for quid pro quo harassment but not for hostile work
environment claims. See Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62
(2d Cir. 1992) (“The supervisor is deemed to act on behalf of the employer when making
decisions that affect the economic status of the employee.”); Carrero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth.,
890 F.2d 569, 579 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[T]he harassing employee acts as and for the company,
holding out the employer’s benefits as an inducement to the employee for sexual favors.”).
In 1982, the Eleventh Circuit discussed the distinction between the two claims, explaining
that a hostile work environment could be created by any employee, whether or not that
employee had been given authority by the employer; a quid pro quo harassment claim, on the
other hand, is founded on a supervisory employee being delegated the power by his
employer to alter the terms and conditions of employment to coerce unwanted sexual
conduct. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982). Ultimately, the
Supreme Court would obviate the distinction between these two types of claims, at least to
the extent that the claims relate to vicarious liability. See infra notes 74–77 and
accompanying text.
49. See Karibian, 14 F.3d at 781.
50. See id. at 778.
51. Id. at 777.
52. While the Supreme Court had recognized that quid pro quo harassment claims could
be potentially actionable under Title VII, it did not resolve the issue of whether economic
harm had to be proved. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64–66 (1986)
(noting that no economic harm need be proved for hostile work environment claims, but
distinguishing quid pro quo claims). In Vinson, the district court had concluded that the
employee could not claim harassment, but it was unclear on what basis the lower court had
relied to come to this conclusion. See id. at 67–68. The Supreme Court held that the district
court might have erred because, even if it were correct to conclude that there was no sexual
harassment claim because of a lack of economic harm, the district court failed to consider
whether the plaintiff had stated a hostile work environment claim. See id. at 68. The Court
also held that, if the district court’s conclusion was based on its finding that the sexual
relations were “voluntary,” in the sense that they were not against the plaintiff’s will, that did
not necessarily exclude Title VII liability because the relevant question is whether the
attempts to engage in sex were “unwelcome.” Id.
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employment because she refused to engage in sexual conduct with her
supervisor.53
The Karibian Court acknowledged that the “typical” quid pro quo case
involves a circumstance in which the employee suffers retaliation because
of her refusal to submit to a supervisor’s coercion, but the court concluded
that it does not follow that tangible economic harm is “always essential to
the claim.”54 At this point, the court turned to policy rather than precedent,
observing that if Title VII barred “the victims of sexual harassment who
surrender to unwelcome encounters[,] . . . [s]uch a rule would only
encourage harassers to increase their persistence”—truly a perverse
outcome.55
Instead, the Karibian Court focused on two issues. First, the court
focused on whether the supervisor “linked tangible job benefits to the
acceptance or rejection of sexual advances.”56 On this theory, the tangible
benefit provided to the employee who submits to unwelcome advances is
the retention of her employment. Second, from the Second Circuit’s
perspective, harassment law should focus on the supervisor’s prohibited
conduct, not on the plaintiff’s reaction.57 Whether the plaintiff submitted to
advances might help determine whether the sexual advances were
unwelcome but “not whether unwelcome sexual advances were
unlawful.”58
The Karibian Court’s treatment of the plaintiff’s hostile work
environment claim also broke new ground, for it helped determine when an
employer would be strictly liable for tolerating a hostile work
environment.59 At the time, the plaintiff in hostile work environment cases,
unlike in quid pro quo harassment cases, had to show why the employer
should be liable for the environment fostered by its employees.60 The
Supreme Court had left this issue open in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson,61 which directed lower courts to draw from traditional agency
principles to decide such liability.62 In 1992, in the Kotcher case discussed
above,63 the circuit had found that there was enough evidence of the “sham”
nature of the response to complaints of harassment to justify attributing
53. See Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 906 (1st Cir. 1988) (describing a case in
which plaintiff experienced tangible harms as a result of refusal as the “very essence of quid
pro quo harassment”); Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 805 F.2d 644, 649 (6th Cir.
1986) (finding that a harassment claim was not stated because “the record was totally devoid
of any evidence tending to demonstrate that plaintiff was denied a job benefit or suffered a
job detriment as a result of her failure to engage in the activity”); Henson, 682 F.2d at 910
(discussing sexual harassment “resulting in tangible job detriment”).
54. Karibian, 14 F.3d at 778.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 779.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 777–78.
60. See id. at 778; see also supra note 52.
61. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
62. See id. at 72.
63. See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text.
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liability to the employer for its employee’s harassment.64 But Karibian
presented a different set of facts, and the court turned back to traditional
agency principles to determine the scope of an employer’s liability.65 First,
however, the court rejected the bright-line rule advanced by Columbia
University and apparently accepted by the district court, namely that in
every case the plaintiff must prove that the employer either provided no
“reasonable avenue” for complaints or knew of the harassment but took no
action.66
The circuit identified several factors that would influence whether an
employer should be held liable for a hostile work environment claim under
Title VII. Most critical in Karibian was that the alleged harasser was a
supervisor who used his delegated authority to create an abusive
environment based on sex.67 Therefore, the circuit stated that the employer
could be held liable because the supervisor was acting at least within the
scope of his apparent authority.68 The court also held that an employer
could be held liable where a supervisor is “aided in accomplishing the
harassment by the existence of the agency relationship.”69 The court
contrasted this situation with a situation in which a “low-level supervisor”
does not perpetrate the harassment in reliance on his supervisory
authority.70 There, the employer is not liable unless it failed to provide a
reasonable avenue for complaints or did not take any action in the face of
known harassment.71 In the Karibian case, the court found that there was
enough evidence to go to the jury on the issue of whether Columbia
University was responsible for the allegedly hostile work environment,
stating “[i]t would be a jarring anomaly to hold that conduct which always
renders an employer liable under a quid pro quo theory does not result in
liability to the employer when that same conduct becomes so severe and
pervasive as to create a discriminatorily abusive work environment.”72
The Karibian case received attention immediately after it was announced.
The New York Times described it as setting a precedent in the quid pro quo
context, while also increasing the burden on defendants in hostile work
environment cases.73 Although the contours of sexual harassment litigation
have changed over the years, Karibian has withstood the test of time. Most
notably, four years after Karibian was announced, the Supreme Court
issued two decisions, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton74 and Burlington

64. See Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 1992).
65. See Karibian, 14 F.3d at 780.
66. See id. at 779.
67. See id. at 779–80.
68. See id. at 780.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 781.
73. Jan Hoffman, Columbia University May Be Sued in Sex Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29,
1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/01/29/nyregion/columbia-u-may-be-sued-in-sex-case.
html [https://perma.cc/GQS2-XHN3].
74. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
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Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,75 both of which collapsed the distinction between
quid pro quo harassment claims and hostile work environment claims.76
Rather than hinging vicarious liability on the characterization of the claim,
the Supreme Court held in both cases that the proper focus was on whether
the “supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible employment
action.”77
Even though the hard-line context in which Karibian operated had
changed, the key insights from the decision survived. A 2002 Second
Circuit decision preserved Karibian’s reasoning even though the Supreme
Court’s analyses in Faragher and Ellerth reframed sexual harassment
law.78 Like Karibian, Jin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance79 was a case in
which the plaintiff was coerced to have sex with her supervisor because he
“explicitly threatened to fire her if she did not submit, and then allowed her
to keep her job after she submitted.”80 Judge Wilfred Feinberg’s opinion
for the court distinguished Ellerth (in which the supervisor’s threats were
never carried out) because, unlike the plaintiff in Ellerth, the plaintiff in Jin
was required to submit to sex in order to grant a tangible benefit (continued
employment).81 The court concluded:
[W]hen a victim is coerced into submitting to a supervisor’s sexual
mistreatment, the threatened detrimental economic tangible employment
action may not take place. But that does not mean that the use of the
submission as the basis for other job decisions does not also constitute
tangible employment action. Because Faragher and Ellerth support our
earlier holding in Karibian that economic harm is not required to hold an
employer liable in a submission case, we see no persuasive reason to
abandon our prior judgment on that issue.82

The Ninth Circuit followed the Second Circuit’s approach. In Holly D. v.
California Institute of Technology,83 the plaintiff claimed that her
supervisor implicitly threatened to fire her if she did not submit to his
sexual demands.84 The court held that when, “in order to avoid the
threatened action, the employee complies with the supervisor’s demands,” a

75. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
76. Heather S. Murr, The Continuing Expansive Pressure to Hold Employers Strictly
Liable for Supervisory Sexual Extortion:
An Alternative Approach Based on
Reasonableness, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529, 534–36 (2006).
77. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
78. Jin v. Metro. Life Ins., 310 F.3d 84, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2002).
79. 310 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2002).
80. Id. at 94.
81. See id. at 94, 97 (“It is hardly surprising that this type of conduct—a classic quid pro
quo for which courts have traditionally held employers liable—fits squarely within the
definition of ‘tangible employment action’ that the Supreme Court announced in Faragher
and Ellerth.”). The Court in Ellerth affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Jansen v.
Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997). See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 750, 765–66.
Indeed, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Jansen relied explicitly on Karibian. See Jansen,
123 F.3d at 499–500.
82. Jin, 310 F.3d at 98.
83. 339 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2003).
84. See id. at 1163–64.
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tangible employment action occurs.85 The court stated that “when the
supervisor actually coerces sex by abusing the employer’s authority, and
thus makes concrete the condition of employment he has imposed,” his
harassment “culminates in a ‘tangible employment action.’”86
When then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg reflected on the 1970s cases in
which she and her colleagues at the ACLU crafted a path toward heightened
scrutiny of classifications based on gender, she highlighted principles that
would come to characterize the Second Circuit’s nuanced approach to
sexual harassment challenges: interrogating the rationalization used by
some courts to justify differential treatment of men and women based on
“natural” differences and the link between subordination and sex-specific
roles and relationships.87 Karibian and the other Second Circuit cases
surrounding sexual harassment exemplify the same principles in a different
context: the need to challenge ideas about “natural” sexual relations and to
see the link between subordination in the workplace and traditional ideas
about how men and women relate to each other. The Second Circuit’s
approach continued the trajectory that Justice Ginsburg and other advocates
had so successfully negotiated in the 1970s. In so doing, the court left an
important mark in the area.
II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S LEADING ROLE
IN PRISONERS’ RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE
The Second Circuit is home to one of the largest prison systems in the
country: the New York State Department of Corrections and Community
Supervision.88 Moreover, New York City’s jails house more people than do
many state correctional systems.89 Combine these variables with an active
and well-established prisoners’ rights lawyering community, represented in
small firms as well as large nonprofit organizations like the Legal Aid
Society’s Prisoners’ Rights Project, and it is no surprise that the Second
Circuit has been the focus of many significant prisoners’ rights cases.
Most prisoners’ rights cases revolve around the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment, which prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.”90 For a
number of reasons that have been explored and discussed elsewhere, federal
85. Id. at 1167.
86. Id. at 1170.
87. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal
Thought of the 1970s, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 9, 11.
88. As of 2014, New York State had approximately 77,500 adults in prison or jail,
exceeded only by Texas (219,100 adults), California (207,100 adults), Florida (153,600
adults), Georgia (91,000 adults), and Pennsylvania (85,200 adults). See DANIELLE KAEBLE ET
AL., CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2014, at 17–18 (2016).
89. At the end of 2014, almost 10,000 people were held in New York City jails. See
COMM’N OF CORRECTION, INMATE POPULATION STATISTICS, http://www.scoc.ny.gov/pop.htm
(last visited Sept. 6, 2016) [https://perma.cc/6X5W-R8Q8]. This figure is larger than the
number of people held in prisons and jails in the District of Columbia and the following
states: Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. See DANIELLE KAEBLE ET
AL., supra note 88, at 17–18.
90. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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courts did not begin to develop robust Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
until the 1970s.91 While some state courts were called upon to interpret
their own state constitutions’ punishment provisions in the 1800s, it is fair
to say that the constitutionality of particular punishments, including the
conditions of confinement experienced by people held in jails and prisons,
was woefully underexamined for most of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries.92 To the extent that courts did examine the question, they
deferred greatly to the judgment of legislators and prison administrators,
prompting many to refer to the time period between the founding and the
late twentieth century as a “hands-off” period.93
Other than Weems v. United States,94 which was an unusual decision
from 1910 in which the Supreme Court struck down a sentence imposed by
a court in the Philippines, finding it to be cruel and unusual punishment,95
the Court had given little hint that it questioned the orthodox view that
courts had little to nothing to say about the daily living experience of people
held in prisons or jails. The first sign of any real change came almost fifty
years later, in 1958, in Trop v. Dulles,96 in which the Supreme Court again
struck down a punishment as being cruel and unusual.97 The question in
Trop involved whether a sentence of denationalization as a punishment for
military desertion was consistent with the Eighth Amendment.98 A
plurality of the Court found that the sentence violated both the Eighth
Amendment and international law principles because it was contrary to
“evolving standards of decency.”99 This framework would become a
central tenet of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as Trop was extended in
1976 by Estelle v. Gamble,100 the first modern case to challenge prison
conditions alone, separate and apart from a criminal sentence. The Estelle
Court looked to both Weems and Trop to establish that the Eighth
Amendment applied to more than “physically barbarous punishments,”101
but also to punishments incompatible with “evolving standards of
decency”102 or involving the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of
91. See generally Alexander A. Reinert, Eighth Amendment Gaps: Can Conditions of
Confinement Litigation Benefit from Proportionality Theory?, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 53
(2009).
92. See id. at 60–65.
93. See Ira P. Robbins, The Cry of Wolfish in the Federal Courts: The Future of
Federal Judicial Intervention in Prison Administration, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211,
212–13 (1980) (summarizing the hands-off doctrine and erosion of the approach in the lower
courts); see also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974) (discussing the
traditional hands-off policy of federal courts with respect to problems of prison
administration), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
94. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
95. See id. at 382.
96. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
97. See id. at 99–101.
98. See id. at 87.
99. Id. at 101.
100. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
101. Id. at 102 (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 100–01; Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1910)).
102. Id. (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101).
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pain.”103 With these standards in mind, the Court held that the government
had some obligation to provide medical care to prisoners, because the
absence of such care could “result in pain and suffering which no one
suggests would serve any penological purpose.”104 Deprivations of medical
care that amounted to “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs”
were equivalent, in the Court’s view, to unnecessary infliction of pain.105
From Estelle, much significant prisoners’ rights litigation was born,
including cases involving mental health treatment, protection from harm
from other prisoners, challenges to material conditions of confinement such
as cell size, food, and sanitary conditions, and use of force by correctional
staff.106 From Trop on, however, the Second Circuit has played a
significant role in the development of constitutional protections for people
held in our nation’s prisons and jails.
Trop originated in the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiff had
served in the U.S. Army in 1944 in French Morocco, but he was convicted
by court-martial of desertion in the time of war.107 Under the governing
statute at the time, his conviction of desertion resulted in his expatriation.108
He filed a complaint in the Eastern District seeking a declaration that he
was a “national of the United States.”109 The district court summarily
dismissed his complaint, and the Second Circuit upheld the dismissal.110
The majority opinion, however, specifically declined to address the
question of whether the punishment was consistent with the Eighth
Amendment, finding that the plaintiff had not raised that issue.111 Chief
Judge Charles Clark wrote an extremely brief dissent, incorporating fully
the arguments made in a comment that appeared in the Yale Law
Journal.112 Although Chief Judge Clark’s dissent was only two paragraphs
long, he was prescient in recognizing the critical role of “dignity” in Eighth
Amendment review, a word that the Court ultimately has adopted as a
touchstone for Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.113

103. Id. at 103 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 28 U.S. 153, 178 (1976)).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 104.
106. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835–36 (1994) (applying Estelle in failure to
protect context); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993) (discussing Estelle’s
deliberate indifference standard’s application in prison conditions cases); Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1992) (contextualizing Estelle in an excessive force claim);
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347–48 (1981) (applying Estelle in a challenge to
double-celling).
107. Trop, 356 U.S. at 87.
108. See id. at 88 n.1 (describing the statutory framework).
109. Trop v. Dulles, 239 F.2d 527, 528 (2d Cir. 1956), rev’d, 356 U.S. 86.
110. Id. at 528–30.
111. See id. at 529–30.
112. See id. at 530 (Clark, C.J., dissenting) (citing Comment, The Expatriation Act of
1954, 64 YALE L.J. 1164, 1189–99 (1955)).
113. See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011) (stating that “[p]risoners retain the
essence of human dignity inherent in all persons”); Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence
of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 223–28 (2011) (discussing the role of dignity in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence).
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The Supreme Court seemed moved by Chief Judge Clark’s dissent,
because the Court granted certiorari and reversed, marking a significant turn
in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.114 Moreover, the plurality opinion
specifically indicated its agreement with Chief Judge Clark’s dissent and
quoted the first paragraph in full.115 Although Trop’s “evolving standards
of decency” framework116 would ultimately play a central role in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, the case did not initially have a wide impact. It
was not until 1976 that the Supreme Court expanded Trop’s analysis to
conditions of confinement in Estelle.117
Between 1958 and 1976, however, the Second Circuit established itself
as a court with admirable foresight about how judicial regulation of prison
conditions could be accomplished through the Eighth Amendment. The
first example of such a case began in the early 1960s in Wright v.
McMann.118 Lawrence Wright was serving a life sentence in Clinton
Correctional Facility after being convicted, by a jury in state court, of
sodomy, assault, and carnal abuse of an eleven-year-old boy.119 In
February 1965, he was placed in solitary confinement for what was only
described as “a violation of a prison regulation.”120
According to Wright’s complaint, which he filed pro se:
[T]he . . . solitary confinement cell . . . was dirty, filthy and unsanitary,
without adequate heat and virtually barren; the toilet and sink were
encrusted with slime, dirt and human excremental residue superimposed
thereon[.] [Wright] was without clothing and entirely nude for several
days . . . until he was given a thin pair of underwear to put on[.] [Wright]
was unable to keep himself clean or perform normal hygienic functions as
he was denied the use of soap, towel, toilet paper, tooth brush, comb, and
other hygienic implements and utensils therefore[.] [Wright] was
compelled under threat of violence, assault or other increased
punishments to remain standing at military attention in front of his cell
door each time an officer appeared from 7:30 A.M. to 10:00 P.M. every
day, and he was not permitted to sleep during the said hours under the
pain and threat of being beaten or otherwise disciplined therefore[.] [T]he
windows in front of his confinement cell were opened wide throughout
the evening and night hours of each day during subfreezing temperatures
causing [him] to be exposed to the cold air and winter weather without
clothing or other means of protecting himself or to escape the detrimental
effects thereof . . . .121

According to his complaint, he was forced to sleep on the cold, rough,
concrete floor, as the cell had no furniture apart from a sink and toilet.122
He was kept continuously in that cell for a total of thirty-three days and, a
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See Trop, 356 U.S. at 104.
See id. at 101 & n.33.
Id. at 101.
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
257 F. Supp. 739 (N.D.N.Y. 1966), rev’d, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967).
See id. at 741.
Id.
Wright, 387 F.2d at 521 (first alteration in original).
See id.
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year later, was again placed in a “strip cell” for twenty-one consecutive
days for violating another prison rule.123 Wright requested injunctive relief
and monetary damages.
The district court denied Wright’s claim on the ground that (1) “[t]he
complaint makes no sufficient showing of the denial of plaintiff’s
constitutional rights” and, in the alternative, (2) “[p]laintiff’s remedy, if
any, lies in the state courts.”124 As to the former, the district court found
that the complaint failed to demonstrate “exceptional circumstances” of
confinement to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.125 In
the absence of controlling authority governing the specific conditions of
Wright’s confinement, the court was “content to hold that the complaint,
which lack[ed] allegations of physical injury,” failed to show a departure
from accepted methods of prison punishment.126 The court reasoned that
“[e]very punishment in a sense involves cruelty since it imposes by force
conditions at odds with the concept of the freedom of the person from all
forms of trespass, and freedom of action.”127 With respect to the alternative
ground for the court’s holding, its reasoning rested on “[t]he general rule
that the internal administration of state prisons is the state’s primary
responsibility and not a matter of federal intervention.”128 In other words,
the district court’s opinion was consistent with the “hands-off” doctrine that
had characterized federal jurisprudence at that time.
More than a decade before the Supreme Court would address (albeit in a
sideways fashion) solitary confinement conditions in a case out of
Arkansas,129 the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s decision in
Wright. In an opinion authored by Judge Irving Kaufman, the Second
Circuit embraced a far more muscular role for the federal judiciary in
policing the living experience of people in prison.130 The court rejected the
State’s attempt to justify the confinement as “necessary” for prison
regulation and admitted that Wright’s treatment was “strictly routine” for a
violation of prison discipline.131 Finding that the conditions “offend[ed]
more than ‘some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism,’” the
court held that, if proven, they would “constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.”132 Rejecting the “hands-off” policy of deference to prison
officials in the State’s punishment practices, the court held that “civilized
standards of humane decency simply do not permit a man for a substantial
period of time to be denuded and exposed to the bitter cold of winter in
123. See id. at 522. The content of these rules was not contained within the record. See
id. at 522 n.4.
124. Wright, 257 F. Supp. at 745.
125. Id. at 747.
126. Id. at 745.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687–88, 700 (1978) (upholding an order to
remedy extreme overcrowding, pervasive violence, insufficient food, and unsanitary
conditions).
130. See Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 527 (2d Cir. 1967).
131. Id. at 526 n.15.
132. Id. at 525 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).

90

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

northern New York State and to be deprived of the basic elements of
hygiene such as soap and toilet paper.”133 Echoing Chief Judge Clark’s call
to consider the dignity of the plaintiff in Trop, the Wright Court observed
that “[t]he subhuman conditions alleged by Wright to exist in the ‘strip cell’
at Dannemora could only serve to destroy completely the spirit and
undermine the sanity of the prisoner.”134 The court therefore remanded to
the district court to allow Wright to proceed on his claims.135
On remand, Wright’s case was consolidated with that of another prisoner,
Robert Mosher.136 In a long and eloquent opinion, the district judge, newly
assigned to the case (because the judge to whom the case was first assigned
had died), wrote that horrid prison conditions were a systemic problem and
renounced the rationale that “if unpleasant problems arise in the prisons, the
prisoners brought it on themselves and the less public notice the better.”137
Taking a cue from the Second Circuit, the lower court stated that “[n]o
longer can prisons and their inmates be considered a closed society with
every internal disciplinary judgment to be blissfully regarded as immune
from the limelight that all public agencies ordinarily are subject to.”138
Though the court acknowledged that security in maximum-security
prisons is an important state objective, it asserted that this interest can
“never” justify treatment and prison procedures that violate human decency
and constitutional rights.139 While the court posited that segregation under
proper conditions in a state prison is not unconstitutional per se, it credited
testimony from a psychiatrist who testified to “the care to be taken
concerning its conditions and the length of its use due to the serious impact
it may have upon certain prisoners [because of] their individual mental and
physical attitudes and capacities.”140 The court ultimately rested its finding
of unconstitutional punishment on the physical conditions of the cell (e.g.,
filthy, barren, etc.), and the abuse to which Wright was subjected (e.g.,
being forced to sleep nude on a rough concrete floor with no windows in
the winter).141 Wright was ultimately granted $1,500 in compensatory
damages and no punitive damages.142
The court similarly found aspects of Mosher’s punishment to be
unconstitutional. Mosher had been placed in solitary confinement for five
months for failing to sign a “safety sheet,” which he genuinely believed
would constitute waiver to sue the State for personal injuries suffered due to
negligence.143 The district court held that, with respect to the alleged
133. Id. at 526.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 527.
136. See Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127, 131 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
137. Id. at 132.
138. Id.
139. Id. (“The judicial complacency of the past in regard to these problems and cautions
for courts to refrain whenever possible . . . has been discarded.”).
140. Id. at 138.
141. See id. at 138–39.
142. See id. at 144.
143. Id. at 134–35, 145.
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Eighth Amendment violations, Mosher’s initial segregation and
prolongation of that segregation was a “grossly disproportionate
punishment” for the offense he committed.144 The court thus granted
positive injunctive relief, requiring the prisons to promulgate (1) rules
ensuring that segregation cell facilities were adequate to safeguard the
health of occupants and (2) rules governing (a) procedures of prison
disciplinary hearings, (b) the conditions of psychiatric observation, and (c)
procedures to determine whether an inmate should be confined to such a
cell.145 The State appealed.146
On this second appeal, the Second Circuit relied on an intervening en
banc decision in order to reverse the district court’s imposition that the
State promulgate rules and regulations governing disciplinary hearings and
procedures used in determining whether an inmate should be confined to a
psychiatric observation cell.147 Still careful to voice its admonition of
“inhumane, degrading treatment,” the court, in an opinion by Judge J.
Edward Lumbard, deferred to the New York legislature, which had recently
enacted and amended laws to respond to these conditions.148 But while the
court absolved the State from having to make new prison rules, it affirmed
the district court’s findings of unconstitutional conditions for each
plaintiff.149
With respect to Wright, the court held that the Warden of Clinton could
be personally liable because he knew of the inhumane conditions in the
strip cells.150 The court sympathized that “Wright should be properly
compensated for the suffering he endured, and recovery should not be
defeated by an attempt by the warden to shift responsibility to
inferiors . . . when responsibility for permitting such conditions to exist was
ultimately, in any event, squarely his.”151
As for Mosher, while the court noted that an “inmate alleging
disproportionate punishment will ordinarily have a heavy burden,” it found
that he successfully met that burden.152 Specifically, the court found that
placing Mosher in solitary confinement for five months for failing to sign a
“safety sheet,” out of the belief that doing so would constitute a waiver of
his right to sue, constituted disproportionate punishment.153 The purpose of
the sheet was simply to assure that inmates were familiar with safety
144. See id.
145. See id. at 141–42.
146. See Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1972).
147. See id. at 130–31 (citing Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc)).
148. Id. at 131.
149. See id. at 129.
150. See id. at 135. The court was not concerned that imposing personal liability on the
Warden would dissuade qualified candidates from seeking the position. See id. (“In the
unlikely event that a prospective superintendent in fact turns down an offer for fear of
personal liability, we think that the position is probably better filled by someone determined
to supervise the facility so as to prevent the type of inmate treatment giving rise to this
lawsuit.”).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 132–33.
153. Id. at 133–34, 145.
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regulations, and even the Warden testified that “segregation as punishment
for refusal to sign the sheet was inappropriate.”154
Wright laid the groundwork for many subsequent prison conditions cases,
which became particularly important in the wake of the Attica riots in
September of 1971.155 One commentator has described Wright as one of
the first cases to reflect increasing skepticism “about the benevolence of
government and the capacity of the experts to ‘rehabilitate,’
and . . . sensitiv[ity] to claims of fairness, equal treatment, and due
process.”156 Around the time that the Second Circuit handed down the
decision, Judge Kaufman described it as part of a trend in judges
“abandon[ing] the traditional judicial resistance to correcting any but the
most egregious injustice in the prison system.”157 With its emphasis on
dignity and “civilized standards of humane decency,” the decision foresaw
many of the themes and standards that the Supreme Court ultimately would
adopt in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.158 Even now, with its
recognition that proportionality principles should apply to punishment
meted out within prison, and not just punishment handed down by the
sentencing judge, Wright’s principles play a significant role in ongoing
challenges to the use of solitary confinement throughout the country.159
Wright is just one of many cases in which the Second Circuit has helped
to develop prisoners’ rights jurisprudence. In 1970, the Second Circuit
found that a prisoner stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment where he

154. Id. at 133.
155. See Andrew B. Mamo, “The Dignity and Justice That Is Due to Us by Right of Our
Birth”: Violence and Rights in the 1971 Attica Riot, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 542 &
n.57 (2014) (identifying Wright as one of the cases that reflected an increasingly popular
view of seeing the Eighth Amendment to protect “against both direct abuse by prison
officials and unconstitutionally punitive conditions of incarceration”).
156. JEFFREY B. MORRIS, FEDERAL JUSTICE IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT: A HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS IN NEW YORK, CONNECTICUT & VERMONT, 1787 TO 1987, at 186
(1987). The Second Circuit relied on Wright in LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974 (2d
Cir. 1972), a case decided shortly thereafter that was one of the first to examine the effects
that solitary confinement may have on a person in prison. See id. In LaReau, the court held
that the conditions constituted an Eighth Amendment violation because the isolation cell
“seriously threatened the physical and mental soundness of its unfortunate occupant.” Id. at
978.
157. Irving R. Kaufman, Book Review, 86 HARV. L. REV. 637, 639 (1973).
158. Wright, 460 F.2d at 131 (quoting Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 526 (2d Cir.
1967)).
159. Perhaps closest to home, Professor Reinert has been involved in litigation that
resulted in widespread reforms to New York State’s use of solitary confinement and that was
premised on the claim that disproportionate sentences to solitary confinement violate the
Eighth Amendment. See Peoples v. Annucci, No. 11-CV-2694 (SAS), 2016 WL 1464613, at
*11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2016) (approving class action settlement implementing “a significant
step toward improving the conditions of solitary confinement throughout New York State”);
Peoples v. Fischer, 898 F. Supp. 2d 618, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding that the plaintiff
stated a viable Eighth Amendment claim because his solitary sentence was “grossly
disproportionate to the non-violent violation that he was found to have committed”);
Richardson v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 10 Civ. 6137 (SAS), 2011 WL 4091491, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 13, 2011) (finding an Eighth Amendment claim to be viable based on the “atypical and
extreme sentence” to solitary).
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was treated with “deliberate indifference,”160 and six years later the
Supreme Court adopted that standard when it held that prisoners have a
constitutional right to minimally adequate health care.161 The Second
Circuit was one of the first courts of appeals to apply the “deliberate
indifference” framework to claims that prison officials failed to protect
prisoners from assault at the hands of other prisoners162—almost a decade
before the Supreme Court did the same.163 Although the Second Circuit
was sometimes so far ahead of the curve that the Supreme Court expressed
profound disagreement with the appellate court’s intervention in the
workings of prisons and jails,164 the following excerpt from one of the
circuit’s many cases involving prison and jail conditions testifies to its
leading role in protecting prisoners’ rights:
The conditions in our prisons are inextricably related to our system of
criminal justice and what might otherwise be lawful detention becomes an
unconstitutional restriction when those conditions become so
dehumanizing as to constitute an additional hardship beyond the need for
custody in violation of the detainees’ due process and equal protection
rights. The failure in the past of legislators to take the proper correctional
action to remedy these inhuman conditions for both detainees and
convicted prisoners has eroded the historical reluctance of federal courts
to interfere with the administration of penal institutions. Indeed this
failure has required the courts to take action in the interests of
fundamental decency and the protection of the constitutional rights of the
inmates.165

In the Supreme Court’s recent reminder that prisoners “retain the essence
of human dignity inherent in all persons,”166 one can hear the echoes of the
Second Circuit’s longstanding prisoners’ rights jurisprudence. The Second
Circuit is one of the courts that has led the way in recognizing that a prison
system that deprives people of that dignity “has no place in a civilized
society,” prompting the judicial responsibility to provide a remedy, even if
it requires intruding on the decision making of prison officials.167

160. Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921, 924 (2d Cir. 1970).
161. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 n.10 (1976) (citing Martinez, 443 F.2d at
921). The Estelle Court also quoted and relied upon a 1974 case from the Second Circuit
that used and applied the “deliberate indifference” formulation. Id. at 104 n.10, 106 n.14
(citing Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1974)).
162. See Villante v. Dep’t of Corr., 786 F.2d 516, 523 (2d Cir. 1986).
163. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).
164. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562–63 (1979) (reversing and remanding a
Second Circuit decision upholding pretrial detainees’ challenges to conditions in federal
pretrial detention facility).
165. Detainees of Brooklyn House of Det. for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 397 (2d
Cir. 1975) (citations omitted).
166. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510–11 (2011).
167. See id.
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III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S LEADING ROLE
PROTECTING ACCESS TO PUBLIC BENEFITS
The Second Circuit has developed substantial jurisprudence around
issues concerning public benefits, including public assistance, Social
Security, and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). In particular, the court
has emphasized the importance of fair process in determinations of
eligibility. Fair process is essential to the administration of benefit
programs for a number of reasons. First, it is a necessary means of ensuring
that benefits reach those for whom such programs were intended.
Erroneous denials of benefits have plagued the administration of these
programs for decades, leading them to fall short of the protection and
support they were created to provide.168 Second, judicial review of agency
procedure in determining eligibility is critical to treatment of benefits as
legal entitlements, rather than simple gratuities provided by the state.169
The proposition that applicants can sue to establish fair procedures is vital
in bringing the rule of law to the administration of public benefits, ensuring
that officials are required to adhere to articulated standards and processes.
This also signals to beneficiaries that they are rights holders—rather than
supplicants—who can thus hold their government accountable as to those
rights.170 Taken together, procedural rights have a major impact on the
power relationship and dynamics between clients and street-level
administrators. By stressing the importance of fair process, the Second
Circuit has played a key role in shaping how we think about public benefit
programs and how they operate today.
A. Public Assistance
The 1960s brought about a revolution in the way that public benefit
programs are conceived and administered. The Second Circuit was at the
forefront of this revolution, largely through its involvement in Goldberg v.
Kelly,171 one of the foundational cases in the field.172 While Goldberg is
often cited as the fount of the “new property” jurisprudence,173 or the
168. See infra note 218.
169. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
170. See MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, 1960–1973, at 90–97 (1993).
171. 397 U.S. 254 (1970), aff’g Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The
action in Goldberg was initiated in the Southern District of New York under the case name
Kelly v. Wyman, and was decided by a three-judge panel that included Circuit Judge Wilfred
Feinberg. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 255–56, 261. Although state officials were party
defendants in the action filed in the Southern District of New York, only the Commissioner
of Social Services of the City of New York appealed. See id. Therefore, when the case was
appealed to the Supreme Court, the name changed to Goldberg v. Kelly. See id. As
discussed in this Article, the Supreme Court’s decision in Goldberg drew in significant part
on the lower court’s opinion in Wyman.
172. For a discussion of the history of Goldberg, see generally DAVIS, supra note 170.
See also Symposium, The Legacy of Goldberg v. Kelly: A Twenty Year Perspective, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 729 (1990).
173. In establishing this proposition, the Court cited two seminal articles by Charles A.
Reich that contend that benefits are more properly conceived of as property than as a
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source of the elements of due process, the discussion here focuses on
Goldberg’s grounding in the conditions and strategies that surrounded
public assistance administration in New York City in the late 1960s.
Goldberg began with the filing of Kelly v. Wyman174 in 1968 by attorneys at
MFY Legal Services, the first law office established with the mission of
fighting poverty, rather than the more general aim of simply providing
representation to indigent clients.175 From the start, Goldberg was intended
to break new ground. On one level, the action involved a narrow issue
concerning an individual’s right to a hearing prior to the termination of
public assistance benefits. On a much higher level, however, the case
presented the sweeping legal questions of whether individuals could assert
rights afforded under property law in the context of public assistance and
what legal rights they had against state agencies.176
The objective of Goldberg was to replace a system of discretionary
administration, where welfare caseworkers exercised extraordinary
authority over clients, with a legal regime bounded by rules to limit and
check caseworkers.177 Prior to Goldberg, a caseworker could threaten a
client with immediate termination of benefits for failure to comply with a
directive, throwing the client’s life into immediate turmoil.178 While an
appeal could lead to the restoration of benefits at some later date, the
damage to the client already would have occurred.179 Clients pushed back
against caseworkers’ decisions at their peril. But, after Goldberg, the client
could appeal, thereby staying the termination until the decision received
independent review.180 If the termination lacked a sound basis, it would
never go into effect.
Goldberg plaintiff John Kelly’s situation illustrates the impact of this
change in procedure.181 Kelly’s caseworker had directed him to move out
of one single-room-occupancy (SRO) hotel and into another.182 Given the
caseworker’s control over his benefits, Kelly complied with this request
despite finding the second hotel to be filled with addicts and alcoholics.183
Kelly, finding his living situation to be untenable, eventually moved out of
the second hotel.184 When the clerk at the second SRO reported to the
gratuity. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 n.8 (citing Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and
Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965); Charles A. Reich,
The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964)).
174. 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
175. See id. at 895; see also DAVIS, supra note 170, at 30–35 (discussing MFY Legal
Services).
176. See DAVIS, supra note 170, at 90–97.
177. See id. As Professor Sylvia A. Law, one of the original lawyers in Goldberg, put it,
“[n]ot only did poor people have no process in the 1960s, but, in a fundamental sense, they
had no law.” Sylvia A. Law, Some Reflections on Goldberg v. Kelly at Twenty Years, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 805, 806 (1990).
178. See Wyman, 294 F. Supp. at 904–05.
179. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263–64 (1970).
180. See id.
181. See Brief for Appellees app. at 76–77, Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254 (No. 62).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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caseworker that Kelly had moved out, the caseworker terminated Kelly’s
benefits and then refused to meet with him.185 As a result, Kelly was forced
to live on the streets.186
Advocates for assistance recipients viewed the right to a pretermination
hearing as key to their efforts to mobilize a grassroots movement of
recipients.187 At the time, the National Welfare Rights Organization was
actively seeking to build a campaign through protests, sit-ins, and
demonstrations, including sit-ins held at the office of Jack Goldberg, the
Commissioner of Social Services for the City of New York.188 Organizers
focused on urging recipients to claim grants for which they were eligible
and to seek hearings if denied.189 Absent a right to a pretermination
hearing, the potential for retaliation against a recipient was a major
impediment.
While much attention has been paid to Justice William Brennan’s
landmark Supreme Court opinion in Goldberg, there has been less focus on
the critical role played by Second Circuit Judge Wilfred Feinberg’s district
court opinion. To clarify, Goldberg was assigned to a three-judge district
court panel,190 presided over by Judge Feinberg, who had been elevated to
the circuit court only a few years before. The State of New York responded
to the lawsuit by issuing regulations requiring notice and some form of
pretermination process.191 The state regulations offered localities two
options. Option (a) offered recipients the opportunity to appear before an
official, superior to the one who made the decision, and present oral or
written evidence with the aid of an attorney or other representative.192
Option (b) provided recipients only the opportunity to submit written
statements demonstrating continued eligibility.193 New York City was the
only locality in the state to elect option (b).194 Thus, the thrust of the threejudge panel’s analysis—and of the Supreme Court’s analysis—focused on
the adequacy of the process provided, rather than on the right to process as
a threshold matter.195
Judge Feinberg’s opinion set forth a framework that has become famous
in the form of Justice Brennan’s opinion in Goldberg. Judge Feinberg’s
opinion detailed the impact of the destitution that the plaintiffs faced, to
which Justice Brennan only alluded.196 For example, Judge Feinberg’s
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See DAVIS, supra note 170, at 43.
188. See id. at 52.
189. See id. at 49–50.
190. See 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (2012); Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 895 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
191. See Wyman, 294 F. Supp. at 896 & n.6.
192. Id. at 896–97; see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 351.26(a) (2011).
193. See Wyman, 294 F. Supp. at 898; see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18,
§ 351.26(b).
194. See Wyman, 294 F. Supp. at 897–98.
195. See id. at 901; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260 (1970).
196. Compare Wyman, 294 F. Supp. at 899, with Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264 (noting, on a
general level, that “the crucial factor in this context . . . is that termination of aid pending
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opinion discussed the allegations of proposed intervenor Angela Velez,
whose benefits were terminated because her husband allegedly visited her
home every night.197 By the time of the ruling, the State had provided
Velez with a posttermination hearing concluding that the allegations were
not valid.198 In the opinion, Judge Feinberg stressed that during the four
months between the termination of benefits and the hearing decision, Ms.
Velez and her three children had been evicted and forced to live in a single
room in her sister’s apartment—who herself had nine children.199 Judge
Feinberg’s opinion also described plaintiff Esther Lett’s plight, whose
benefits were terminated on the ground that she had concealed
employment.200 Lett and her three children were forced to survive on
handouts from neighbors and became ill after eating spoiled food.201 Lett
fainted from hunger while seeking emergency aid at a welfare center.202
These facts set a persuasive backdrop for Judge Feinberg’s strong
opinion, which stressed that “to cut off a welfare recipient in the face of this
kind of ‘brutal need’ without a prior hearing of some sort is
unconscionable.”203 Judge Feinberg wrote, “there is one overpowering fact
which controls here. By hypothesis, a welfare recipient is destitute, without
funds or assets.”204 Against this strong imperative, Judge Feinberg weighed
the costs of providing pretermination procedures and of paying out benefits
in the interim before a hearing.205 However, he noted, these costs were
substantially within the control of the city and state, since they controlled
the timing of the hearings.206
Judge Feinberg also found that the pretermination process provided by
the City of New York (i.e., option (b)) did not provide an effective
opportunity to be heard.207 Rejecting the sufficiency of a hearing through
written submissions, he wrote that “[n]ot only is the right to a personal
appearance ordinarily implicit in the constitutional concept of a fair hearing,
but the reality of the status of many welfare recipients makes the invitation
to submit their cases in writing cruelly ironic.”208 He cited the vagueness of
the charges, the lack of education of many welfare recipients, and the fact
that eligibility can often be determined by a simple interchange of questions

resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very
means by which to live while he waits”).
197. See Wyman, 294 F. Supp. at 899.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 900. Her request for emergency aid was denied. See id.
203. Id. (quoting Christopher May, Note, Withdrawal of Public Welfare: The Right to a
Prior Hearing, 76 YALE L.J. 1234, 1244 (1967) (arguing the case for pretermination
hearings in the welfare context)).
204. Id. at 899.
205. See id. at 900–01.
206. Id. at 900.
207. See id. at 901.
208. Id. at 903.
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and answers as necessitating an opportunity for an in-person oral
hearing.209
Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Supreme Court provides a significantly
broader and more sweeping discussion of the basics of a fair hearing under
the Due Process Clause than did Judge Feinberg’s opinion.210 Judge Henry
J. Friendly, for example, critiqued the Court for the breadth of its ruling.211
Nonetheless, Judge Feinberg’s decision contains the essence of what was so
powerful about Goldberg—its recognition that the realities of destitution
are not only relevant but are of paramount importance in determining the
scope of the process that is due.212 In this sense, Goldberg bursts through
the bounds of formalism by looking to the situation on the ground and to
people’s lives as they live them. The vast potential of this approach was
sharply curtailed in later cases such as Mathews v. Eldridge,213 which went
to the opposite extreme of looking to legal rules and categories to determine
the extent of due process.214 Years later, Justice Brennan reflected back on
Goldberg, seeing it as a crucial statement about the importance of passion
and empathy in the law.215
One of the key ways in which Goldberg recognizes the importance of
human interaction to fair adjudication is through its emphasis on giving
recipients the opportunity to appear in person before the decision maker and
to engage in direct, oral exchange.216 This emphasis on the oral hearing
reflects a longstanding Second Circuit value: while many courts of appeals
have greatly curtailed the practice of oral argument, in the Second Circuit
oral argument is the norm rather than the exception.217
Although the efforts to organize welfare recipients into a social
movement did not have long-term success, the pretermination hearing
mandated by Goldberg has proven to be an important safeguard for
recipients. Nevertheless, the accuracy of terminations of benefits remains a
major issue in public assistance.218 The form that the pretermination
209. See id. at 903–04.
210. See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
211. See Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1299–304
(1975) (discussing the various issues posed by the wide reach of Justice Brennan’s opinion
in Goldberg).
212. See Wyman, 294 F. Supp. at 899.
213. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
214. See id. at 348–49. Mathews looked to whether disability benefit recipients were
required to be poor rather than whether they were actually poor, either as a group or
individually. See id. at 336–39.
215. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and “The Progress of the Law,” 10
CARDOZO L. REV. 3, 19–23 (1988).
216. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267–69 (1970).
217. See JENNIFER BARNES BOWIE ET AL., THE VIEW FROM THE BENCH AND CHAMBERS:
EXAMINING JUDICIAL PROCESS AND DECISION MAKING ON THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 35–
37 (2014) (reviewing the frequency with which oral argument is denied in the courts of
appeals and stating that judges on the Second Circuit have asserted strong preferences for
oral argument).
218. See Stephen Loffredo & Dan Friedman, Gideon Meets Goldberg: The Case for a
Qualified Right to Counsel in Welfare Hearings, 25 TOURO L. REV. 276, 277 (2009) (noting
that, in New York State alone, tens of thousands of poor families challenge terminations on
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hearing takes often leaves much to be desired because the vast majority of
claimants appear pro se,219 are left to fight terminations in a hearing that
often spans just seven minutes, and usually do not have the chance to
review a copy of the agency’s evidence beforehand.220
The emphasis on work requirements in welfare reform also has made the
sanctioning of recipients a major feature of public assistance administration,
placing recipients at greater risk of erroneous determinations in their
cases.221 Additionally, welfare recipients are vulnerable to the phenomenon
of churning, which is the process of cycling eligible welfare recipients on
and off benefits within a short period of time in an effort to reduce welfare
rolls through burdensome or heightened eligibility requirements.222
Against this backdrop, Goldberg is more critical than ever and looms larger
than ever as a truly remarkable jurisprudential achievement.
B. Disability Benefits
While Goldberg is a case in which the Second Circuit made a key
contribution to the realm of fair process in public assistance programs in a
single decision, the court has had a sustained impact on the system for the
administration of disability benefits through the Social Security Act (“the
an annual basis). In 2007, claimants prevailed in 70 percent of the issues actually
adjudicated at welfare hearings in New York City. Id. at 317 n.146; see also LORI MCNEIL,
URBAN JUSTICE CTR., CASE CLOSED: AN EXAMINATION OF EXCLUSION IN NEW YORK CITY’S
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 13 (2011) (finding that “[p]ublic assistance in NYC suffers
from faulty practices and ineffective procedures, severely affecting the lives of applicants
and recipients”).
219. See Loffredo & Friedman, supra note 218, at 284–85. In New York State, only 1 to
2 percent of claimants are represented by trained advocates while the opposing party, the
welfare department, continues to refine its experience in this setting as a repeat player. See
id. at 278; see also Vicki Lens, In the Fair Hearing Room: Resistance and Confrontation in
the Welfare Bureaucracy, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 309, 329 (2007) (concluding that “the
procedures spawned by Kelly are often an ill-fitting vessel for many welfare recipients”).
220. See Loffredo & Friedman, supra note 218, at 287–88.
221. See Vicki Lens, Examining the Administration of Work Sanctions on the Frontlines
of the Welfare System, 87 SOC. SCI. Q. 573, 573 (2006) (finding that “[t]ransactions between
clients and workers were often routinized and mechanical, resulting in improper and
arbitrary sanctions that were reversed by the hearing officers nearly 50 percent of the time”).
In addition, the Commissioner of New York City’s Human Resources Administration has
reported that approximately one-third of adult public assistance recipients subject to work
requirements are under sanction at any given time and that there is a connection between
sanctions and applications for emergency shelter in New York City’s homeless shelter
system. See Steven Banks, Comm’r of the N.Y.C. Human Res. Admin./Dep’t Soc. Servs.,
Testimony at the 2015 Executive Budget Hearing: Joint Hearing of the New York City
Council Finance and General Welfare Committees (May 19, 2014).
222. See Susan D. Bennett, “No Relief but upon the Terms of Coming into the House”—
Controlled Spaces, Invisible Disentitlements, and Homelessness in an Urban Shelter System,
104 YALE L.J. 2157, 2180–81 (1995) (defining churning as “the rapid administrative closure
of welfare cases, usually as a result of the recipient’s inability to comply with a request for
verification of eligibility or failure to arrive at a scheduled appointment with the intake
caseworker or to meet some other deadline”); see also Anna Lou Dehavenon, Charles
Dickens Meets Franz Kafka: The Maladministration of New York City’s Public Assistance
Programs, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 231 (1990) (discussing churning and the
negative effects it imposes on welfare recipients); David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a
Privitized Welfare System, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 231, 241–50 (1998) (same).
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Act”) by issuing dozens of decisions over the years.223 In Kerner v.
Flemming,224 the Second Circuit established a framework for reviewing
denials of benefits that has set the tone for judicial review and has
developed into a national norm. Twenty years later, the court built on this
framework to play a key role in what amounted to a judicial rebellion
against President Ronald Reagan’s rollback of disability benefit
programs.225 This confrontation between the executive and judicial
branches is notable because it took place on a national scale—involving
thousands of cases—and was largely shaped by the courts of appeals rather
than the Supreme Court.226 And no court of appeals was more vigorous in
upholding the rights of claimants than the Second Circuit.
The disability benefit programs of the Act were added in the 1950s,
decades after its initial passage during the New Deal era in 1935.227 The
Disability Insurance Benefit Program228 was added in 1956 and the SSI
program229 was added approximately twenty years later. Kerner, decided in
1960, was one of the first circuit decisions on an appeal from a denial of
benefits claim under the Act. Judge Henry Friendly’s opinion was widely
influential in setting a tone for how courts would scrutinize agency action
under the new program.
In Kerner, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare had concluded
that the plaintiff, Philip Kerner, could not return to his previous work as a
furniture upholsterer due to a heart condition but, nevertheless, had denied
him benefits on the ground that the record did not establish that Kerner was
precluded from performing light-duty or sedentary work.230 Judge Friendly
quickly established that, although the court’s scope of review is limited
under the Act, judicial review could be, and would be, quite rigorous.231
He opened the analysis by referring to the Secretary’s regulations as written
in “characteristic Janus-faced fashion” and went on to describe the
Secretary’s treatment of the evidence as “exceedingly unsatisfactory.”232
223. See, e.g., Hidalgo v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1987); De Leon v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 734 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1984); Carroll v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 705 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1983); Bastien v. Califano, 572 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1978); Gold
v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 463 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1972).
224. 283 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1960).
225. See infra note 258.
226. The Supreme Court did weigh in on a number of occasions, but often sided with the
Social Security Administration (SSA) rather than with the claimants. For example, while
Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990), and Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467
(1986), were major victories for claimants at the Supreme Court, Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S.
137 (1987), Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104 (1984), and Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458
(1983), were decided in favor of the government.
227. See Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability in the Social
Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REV. 361, 386 (1996).
228. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (2012).
229. Id. § 1381.
230. See Kerner v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 916, 918 (2d Cir. 1960).
231. See id. at 922.
232. Id. at 919. Judge Friendly was referring to the fact that the regulations provided an
example of a disabling impairment while at the same time saying that the existence of such
an impairment or an impairment of great severity “will not in and of itself always permit a
finding that an individual is under a disability as defined in the law.” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R.

2016]

THE SECOND CIRCUIT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

101

Judge Friendly critiqued the manner in which the Secretary had assessed
Kerner’s limitations, ignoring Kerner’s own testimony and the reports of
numerous physicians.233 Judge Friendly also focused on the Secretary’s
treatment of the question of whether, given his limitations, Kerner could
actually work: “[m]ere theoretical ability to engage in substantial gainful
activity is not enough if no reasonable opportunity for this is available.”234
The Secretary had contended that it was Kerner’s burden to establish that
he was incapable of substantial gainful activity.235 The court’s response to
the government’s argument has shaped Social Security law ever since:
where a claimant has “raised a serious question and the evidence affords no
sufficient basis for the Secretary’s negative answer,” the court should
remand to the agency for additional evidence so that it can make specific
findings on what the claimant can and cannot do and whether, in light of
these limitations, work exists that the claimant can perform.236 Thus, the
opinion makes clear that given Kerner’s initial showing, the Secretary could
not rest simply on a generic argument about the burden of proof and, in
particular, that the Secretary has the expertise to “furnish information as to
the employment opportunities . . . or the lack of them, for persons of
plaintiff’s skills and limitations.”237 Contrasting Social Security disability
benefits with Veterans Administration benefits, the court emphasized that
the fact that Congress had accorded judicial review to Social Security
disability claimants means that the court had an obligation to ensure that the
Secretary has reached a rational determination.238
Kerner had a number of major impacts. First, the decision laid the
groundwork for the now well-accepted doctrine that when a claimant
establishes an inability to return to past work due to a medical impairment,
the agency bears the burden of demonstrating that there is other work in the
economy for which the claimant is capable and qualified to perform.239
Kerner thus relieves plaintiffs of the insurmountable burden of establishing
the negative: that there is no work that he or she can perform. If the agency
believes that a significantly impaired claimant can work, it must justify the
basis for its conclusion. Kerner led the Social Security Administration
(SSA) to adopt a regular practice in the 1960s of introducing the testimony
§ 404.1501(d) (1959)). The term “Janus-faced” is one the Second Circuit would reuse when
referring to the SSA. See Hidalgo v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 294, 299 (2d Cir. 1987). For a
discussion of the ambiguities in the SSA’s initial implementation of the disability insurance
program, see Diller, supra note 227.
233. See Kerner, 283 F.2d at 921.
234. Id. (citing Aaron v. Fleming, 168 F. Supp. 291, 295 (M.D. Ala. 1958)).
235. See id.
236. Id. at 922.
237. Id.; see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).
238. See Kerner, 283 F.2d at 922.
239. See id. Kerner also led to substantial confusion about what vocational and
employment factors the SSA should consider in determining disability. See Diller, supra
note 227. This confusion was resolved by Congress in the 1967 Amendments, which made
clear that a claimant’s age, education, and work experience would be considered, but the
availability of particular job openings would not be considered. Social Security Amendments
of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821 (1968).
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of a vocational expert in each hearing to meet this burden by addressing the
question of whether, given a claimant’s limitations and the inability to
perform past work, there is other work in the economy available for the
plaintiff.240 In the late 1970s, the SSA replaced this system with a medicalvocational matrix (known as “the grid”), which is treated as a finding of fact
in each claim where the terms of the matrix are met.241
Second, Kerner established that courts would give close consideration to
the claimant’s testimony about the impact of his or her impairments and the
views of medical sources, including those of the claimant’s treating
physician.242 The court’s consideration of different views of medical
evidence blossomed into an entire jurisprudence on the weight to be
accorded to different medical sources and has played a major role in
transforming judicial review from what could have been a toothless exercise
into a potent safeguard for claimants.
In Gold v. Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare,243 the court again
took the SSA to task in reviewing its determination that claimant Minnie
Gold had failed to establish disability by the date on which her Social
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) expired.244 Judge J. Joseph Smith
reviewed the numerous reports of the physicians who had treated Gold that
had been discounted by the hearing examiner and concluded that “[t]he
expert opinions of plaintiff’s treating physicians as to plaintiff’s
disability . . . are binding upon the referee if not controverted by substantial
evidence to the contrary.”245 This is the first full statement of what would
later be referred to as the Second Circuit’s “treating physician rule.” The
language was a quote from a district court decision in Indiana (which had
cited Kerner),246 and its adoption by the Second Circuit would have major
consequences. Judge Smith went on to critique the hearing examiner for his
harsh treatment of Gold, noting that she was “handicapped by lack of
counsel, ill health, and inability to speak English,” which, in the court’s
view, called for greater care and solicitude.247 Instead, the court described
the examiner as showing “intolerance of her confusion and inability to
digest the written exhibits with which she was faced shortly before the
hearing began.”248 In view of the strength of the treating physicians’
240. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461 (1983).
241. See id. at 461–62.
242. See Kerner, 283 F.2d at 920–21.
243. 463 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1972).
244. See id. at 40. Under the Act, a claimant must meet the disability standard within a
specific time period of ceasing work. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (2012). Gold did not apply for
benefits until many years later and was required to establish disability as of the date she was
last insured. Gold, 463 F.2d at 40–41.
245. Gold, 463 F.2d at 42 (quoting Walker v. Gardner, 266 F. Supp. 998, 1002 (S.D. Ind.
1967)).
246. See Walker, 266 F. Supp. at 1002. The Walker Court also cited Teeter v. Fleming,
270 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1959), a Seventh Circuit decision which stated that treating physician
opinions, while admissible, are not binding per se, but because the opinions were not
contradicted in that case, they were controlling. See id. at 871.
247. Gold, 463 F.2d at 43.
248. Id.
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opinions and what had transpired at the hearing, the court remanded for
payment of benefits rather than the adduction of new evidence—an
important extension of its analysis in Kerner in terms of the weight it placed
on the claimant’s treating physician’s opinion.249
In the years that followed, the Second Circuit would return to the treating
physician rule repeatedly as a central lens through which to analyze
disability benefit appeals. It came to the fore most significantly in dealing
with the Reagan administration’s major roll back in the disability benefit
programs in the early 1980s. In 1981, the new administration targeted both
SSDI and SSI as major sources of cost savings and viewed them as the
poster children for the expansion of the welfare state that it was determined
to halt.250 This major change in course led to the termination of benefits of
hundreds of thousands of recipients and a sharp drop in the allowance rate
on new claims.251 It became a significant political issue, generating
editorials around the country, and ultimately congressional action. The
administration tackled the disability benefit programs on two fronts. First,
it launched a broad program of reviewing the claims of individuals who
were already receiving benefits and terminating the benefits of large
numbers of recipients.252 Second, the administration toughened the
standards for initial applications, thereby substantially reducing allowance
rates.253 In reviewing the status of ongoing recipients, the administration
accorded no initial presumption of disability.254 This meant that the fact
that a recipient had previously been determined to be eligible was given no
weight in the review.255 To the contrary, the new, more stringent standards
were applied, resulting in findings that 495,000 recipients were “no longer
disabled” despite the fact that there had been no finding of medical
improvement.256
This retrenchment flooded the courts with appeals from disability benefit
denials and terminations.257 Many judges recoiled at the harsh and
249. See id. at 44.
250. See generally MARTHA DERTHICK, AGENCY UNDER STRESS: THE SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1990); JENNIFER L. ERKULWATER, DISABILITY
RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SAFETY NET (2006); SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, NO LONGER
DISABLED: THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY (1988).
251. The tightening of disability standards began under the Carter administration based
on a recognition that the disability benefit programs were growing rapidly. See
ERKULWATER, supra note 250, at 94–105. As Martha Derthick has put it, what was
contemplated in 1980 as a process of review of recipients’ eligibility was implemented in
1981 as a purge. See DERTHICK, supra note 250, at 36–37.
252. See Beth S. Glassman, Terminating Social Security Disability Benefits: Another
Burden for the Disabled?, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 195, 195–96 (1983).
253. See ERKULWATER, supra note 250, at 108–09 (noting a process of gradual tightening
of eligibility standards).
254. See DERTHICK, supra note 250, at 5.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. See ERKULWATER, supra note 250, at 124–26; L. Stuart Ditzen, Denied Disability
Benefits, Many Turn to the Courts, PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 1, 1986), http://articles.
philly.com/1986-02-01/news/26089139_1_disability-benefits-eligibility-reviews-federalcourts [https://perma.cc/M2BV-A2LV].
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draconian results that flowed from the initiative,258 particularly from the
SSA’s announced policy of nonacquiescence—its refusal to adopt rules
announced by the courts of appeals at the administrative level—in
adjudicating cases other than the specific claim before the court that
articulated the rule.259 The nonacquiesence policy limited the impact of
judicial review to the individual claims appealed to the judicial level,
denying other claimants the benefit of judicially articulated standards. It
was a red flag to the courts as it threatened to overwhelm them with filings.
The Second Circuit responded to this crisis in a number of ways. Like
other courts, it confronted the termination issue by concluding that in
reviewing eligibility for ongoing benefits, the SSA was required to apply a
“medical improvement standard,” meaning that the agency’s prior finding
of disability established a presumption of continued eligibility for benefits
that could be overcome only by a showing that the recipient had
“improved.”260 In dealing with denials of claims on new applications, the
Second Circuit issued dozens of decisions in individual appeals upholding
claimants’ rights to fair procedures in the administrative process.261 These
decisions created a substantial jurisprudence that amounted to a common
law of substantial evidence review. The principal analytical tool that the
circuit relied on was the treating physician rule announced in Gold and
rooted in the Kerner decision.262 The Second Circuit consistently upheld
the rights of claimants to bring class action litigation seeking injunctive
relief to halt unlawful agency procedures.263 The individual cases
258. For example, District Judge Lee Sarokin referred to the SSA as “a heartless and
indifferent bureaucratic monster destroying the lives of disabled citizens.” Merli v. Heckler,
600 F. Supp. 249, 250 (D.N.J. 1984); see also City of New York v. Heckler, 578 F. Supp.
1109 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Alfonso A. Narvaez, Judge Criticizes U.S. Agency on Denial of
Benefits, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 1984), http://www.nytimes.com/1984/06/08/nyregion/judgecriticizes-us-agency-on-denial-of-benefits.html [https://perma.cc/6V86-XC38]; Robert Pear,
U.S. Flouts Courts in Determination of Benefit Claims, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 1984),
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/05/13/us/us-flouts-courts-in-determination-of-benefitclaims.html (recounting judicial criticisms of the SSA) [https://perma.cc/N36L-YHR5].
259. See William Buzbee, Administrative Agency Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 582 (1985); Carolyn A. Kubitschek, Social Security Administration
Nonacquiescence: The Need for Legislative Curbs on Agency Discretion, 50 U. PITT. L.
REV. 399 (1989).
260. De Leon v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 734 F.2d 930, 936–37 (2d Cir. 1984).
As the court pointed out in De Leon, this was in accord with rulings in eight other circuits.
See id. Congress adopted this standard in the Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984. See
42 U.S.C. § 423(f) (2012).
261. See infra notes 268–70 and accompanying text.
262. See Gold v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 463 F.2d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1972) (citing
Kerner v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1960)).
263. See New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1989), aff’g New York v. Bowen,
690 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Dixon v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1102 (2d Cir. 1986), aff’g
589 F. Supp. 1494 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), vacated sub nom. Bowen v. Dixon, 482 U.S. 922
(1987); City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1984), aff’g 578 F. Supp. 1109
(E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d sub nom. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986). In City
of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1984), the Second Circuit upheld Judge Jack
Weinstein’s decision that the SSA could not rely on the statute of limitations because its
policies were clandestine and could not reasonably be discovered by claimants. See id. at
738. This opened the door to sweeping class-wide relief that required the SSA to reopen
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established standards that could be enforced through class action litigation.
Class action litigation, in turn, protected the courts from being
overwhelmed with individual cases repetitively raising the same issues.
Finally, these two responses came together in two class actions: Stieberger
v. Bowen,264 (Stieberger II) challenging the agency’s policy of
nonacquiesence in circuit court law,265 and Schisler v. Heckler266 (Schisler
I), challenging the agency’s refusal to instruct its adjudicators in the Second
Circuit’s treating physician rule in particular.267
In reviewing individual appeals, the court repeatedly and emphatically
stressed the importance of affording deference to claimants’ treating
physicians and expressed heightened concerns about the agency’s apparent
disregard for the principle. For example, in Hidalgo v. Bowen,268 Judge
Richard Cardamone reviewed the Second Circuit’s jurisprudence on the
treating physician rule, concluding that, in the fifteen years since Gold, the
court had seen the rule “consistently misapplied” by the SSA and that the
number of published decisions on the subject overturning SSA
determinations was “legion.”269 The court identified twenty-three cases and
emphasized “how often the rule has been expounded,” and the court also
indicated “some sense of frustration at how little, if any, impact our
decisions have had on the Secretary and his administrative fact-finders.”270
The Second Circuit’s jurisprudence in individual cases sent a clear message
of skepticism and distrust of the SSA’s administrative processes.
Given the SSA’s apparent pattern of lack of compliance with the treating
physician rule, advocates for claimants turned their attention to seeking
class-wide injunctive remedies. In Schisler I, a class action on the standard
to be applied in continuing disability eligibility reviews, the circuit
confronted the SSA’s lawyers directly on this subject.271 At oral argument,
the court attempted to extract a direct answer to the question of how the
agency dealt with treating physician opinions at the administrative level.272
Counsel reassured the court that the agency’s policy was “the same” as the
Second Circuit’s rule, even if not articulated clearly.273 Despite the
considerable evidence that, as Judge Ralph Winter put it, the “SSA does not
thousands of denied claims. The Supreme Court ultimately upheld this ruling in a
unanimous decision. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 478.
264. 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
265. See id. at 38.
266. 787 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding for the plaintiffs, a class of individuals whose
benefits were terminated during a four-year period, and directing the SSA to draft a rule
codifying the Second Circuit’s treating physician rule to be binding on all SSA factfinders);
see also Schisler v. Bowen (Schisler II), 851 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding the courtmodified Social Security Ruling policy, which codified the Second Circuit’s treating
physician rule); Schisler v. Sullivan (Schisler III), 3 F.3d 563 (2d Cir. 1993) (affirming the
validity of the SSA’s own regulations regarding the treating physician rule).
267. See Schisler I, 787 F.2d at 84.
268. 822 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1987).
269. Id. at 297.
270. Id.
271. See Schisler I, 787 F.2d at 83–84.
272. See id.
273. Id.
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march to that particular drummer,” the court took the representations of
counsel “at face value,” given counsel’s obligation of candor as an officer
of the court.274 However, because of the record of reversals, the court
directed that the SSA “state in relevant publications . . . that adjudicators at
all levels, state and federal, are to apply the treating physician rule of this
circuit.”275 Recognizing that this directive went far beyond the scope of the
Schisler I class, the court noted, the “SSA can hardly object to this result in
light of its representations to us as to what its policy is.”276 It continued,
“all we order here is that [the] SSA tell its adjudicators what it has told us
about the treating physician rule.”277
Responding to the Second Circuit’s order directing the SSA to produce a
publication for its adjudicators,278 the SSA submitted a twelve-page draft
Social Security Ruling on treating physician evidence that the district court
rejected as “fail[ing] to reflect, in significant respects, the treating physician
rule recognized and effective here and to be in place nationwide.”279 The
court found the draft to be “rambling and ambiguous” and noted “[t]here
lurks in its lengthy and discursive texts bases for not applying the treating
physician rule.”280 District Judge John Elfvin took out his red pen and
edited the document himself to track Second Circuit decisions more closely.
The Second Circuit affirmed on appeal, explaining that the purpose of the
remand was to “mitigat[e] what had become an abuse of judicial processes
resulting from [the] SSA’s adjudicators’ ignorance of the treating physician
rule.”281 Accordingly, the court did not rule on the legality of the substance
of the Secretary’s proposed instruction but held that the instruction was not
the appropriate vehicle for developing or announcing new policy.282 Judge
Winter wrote, “[h]aving taken the position that he has adopted the treating
physician rule of this circuit, the Secretary is thereby bound to offer a
formulation of that rule based on our caselaw.”283
The Second Circuit’s handling of the treating physician issue in Schisler I
was certainly extraordinary. It hinged system-wide injunctive relief on
counsel’s statements about agency policy at oral argument, rather than on
analysis of the governing law and regulations, and created obligations for
how evidence is to be weighed at the administrative level based on the
court’s power of substantial evidence review.284 Moreover, the relief
extended beyond the scope of the class certified in the case. This unusual
treatment reflected the fact that the system was in crisis—the agency’s

274. Id.
275. Id. at 84.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See id.
279. Schisler v. Bowen, No. CIV-80-572E, 1987 WL 15330, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 5,
1987), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 851 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1988).
280. Id. at *1 n.3.
281. Schisler II, 851 F.2d at 45.
282. See id.
283. Id.
284. See Schisler v. Heckler (Schisler I), 787 F.2d 76, 85 (2d Cir. 1986).
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sharp change in course flooded the courts with individual cases, many of
which presented compelling cases of hardship and threatened to leave the
federal courts, as District Judge Morris E. Lasker put it, like “Cuchulain
battling the invulnerable tide,” futilely trying to check the SSA one case at a
time.285
The Second Circuit’s remarkable response also reflected the difficulty the
courts faced in fixing the problem. While there were specific SSA policy
statements that could be and were subject to challenge, much of the crisis
resulted from a shift in the adjudicative culture at the agency, as its
leadership pressured adjudicators to tighten standards.286 Indeed, the SSA’s
own administrative law judges rose up in protest and sued the agency for
exerting undue pressure on their decisional processes.287 The problem is
compounded by the SSA’s passive-aggressive approach of refusing to adopt
circuit court standards in its administrative adjudications, coupled with its
failure to seek review for those standards by the Supreme Court. While the
Second Circuit’s approach in the Schisler decisions was therefore
unorthodox, it represented a creative response to an unfolding disaster by a
frustrated court.
Like Schisler, Stieberger v. Heckler288 (Stieberger I) represented another
attempt to close the gap between the Second Circuit’s approach to disability
benefit eligibility and the Reagan administration’s practices.289 This class
action challenged the SSA’s practice of nonacquiesence in decisions of the
Second Circuit generally and arose, in part, from public assertions by
Justice Department and SSA officials that agencies are not bound to follow
the holdings of the courts of appeals beyond implementing specific
orders.290 Under this view, when a circuit court reversed the SSA, the
individual claimant received the benefit of the ruling, but the court’s
reasoning would not be incorporated into the process of deciding similar
claims. The fascinating constitutional questions raised by administrative
nonacquiescence lie beyond the scope of this Article,291 but the issue of
nonacquiesence is an important part of this story.
285. Dixon v. Heckler, 589 F. Supp. 1494, 1510 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d, 785 F.2d 1102
(2d Cir. 1986), vacated sub nom. Bowen v. Dixon, 482 U.S. 922 (1987) (referring to the
William Butler Yeats poem, “Cuchulain’s Fight with the Sea”).
286. See Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1142 (D.D.C.
1984) (finding that “the evidence as a whole, persuasively demonstrated that defendants
retained an unjustifiable preoccupation with allowance rates, to the extent that ALJs could
reasonably feel pressure to issue fewer allowance decisions”).
287. See id. at 1133.
288. 615 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Dean Diller served as the fourth counsel for the
plaintiff class in Stieberger.
289. See Stieberger v. Bowen (Stieberger II), 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
290. See Stieberger I, 615 F. Supp. at 1343–44, vacated, Stieberger II, 801 F.2d at 29; see
also Judicial Review of Agency Action: HHS Policy of Nonacquiescence: Oversight
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. (1985).
291. Compare Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 753 (1989) (arguing that intracircuit
nonacquiescence can be lawful in certain circumstances), with Matthew Diller & Nancy
Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A
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The SSA’s statements about nonacquiescence were understood by lower
court judges as a statement that the SSA would ignore their decisions and
that it did not care whether its determinations accorded with circuit court
standards.292 This remarkable affront to the judiciary put Assistant U.S.
Attorneys in an untenable position, and U.S. Attorney Rudolph Giuliani
wrote to the judges in the Southern District of New York assuring them that
his office would not defend cases that did not meet judicial standards.293
The SSA responded to the Stieberger class action by arguing, in the
alternative, that its policies did not conflict with any Second Circuit
decisions on the issue of disability, and thus it had not engaged in
nonacquiescence to any decisions of the court.294 But even if it had, the
agency argued, nonacquiescence was a perfectly lawful means of
maintaining the national uniformity of the disability benefit programs.295 In
ruling on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction in the initial suit
brought by the class in Stieberger I, District Court Judge Leonard Sand
rejected both of these contentions, finding that the SSA’s lack of
compliance with the treating physician rule was evident and that
nonacquiescence violates basic principles of judicial review dating back to
Marbury v. Madison.296 On appeal from this decision, the Second Circuit
vacated the preliminary injunction in light of the relief ordered just a few
years earlier in the Schisler I decision.297 While Judge Jon Newman
recognized that the district court might ultimately find nonacquiescence in
other holdings of the circuit and that injunctive relief may still be
appropriate, the Schisler I decision spoke to the irreparable harm caused by
the agency’s failure to follow the treating physician rule.298
On remand from the Second Circuit’s decision in Stieberger v. Bowen299
(Stieberger II), Judge Sand ultimately found that the SSA had engaged in
nonacquiescence in at least two areas of Second Circuit law—the treating
physician rule and the standards for dealing with “post-hearing
evidence.”300 In reaching these conclusions, Judge Sand rejected the
Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801, 825 (1990) (arguing that intracircuit
nonacquiescence is fundamentally unconstitutional).
292. See Pear, supra note 258 (stating expressions of judicial outrage).
293. See Letter from Rudolph W. Giuliani, U.S. Att’y, S.D.N.Y., to Constance Baker
Motley, Chief Judge, S.D.N.Y. (June 25, 1984), in 130 CONG. REC. S10,853, 10,883–84
(Sept. 10, 1984). The letter could be viewed as vouching for the government’s position in
the cases then pending, as the plaintiffs in those cases would undoubtedly have had a
different view as to whether the denial of their claims comported with judicial standards.
294. See Stieberger I, 615 F. Supp. at 1344–45.
295. See id. at 1352.
296. 5 U.S. 137 (1803); see Stieberger I, 615 F. Supp. at 1353 (citing Marbury, 5 U.S.
137).
297. See Stieberger v. Bowen (Stieberger II), 801 F.2d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1986).
298. See id. at 37–38.
299. 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
300. See Stieberger v. Sullivan (Stieberger III), 738 F. Supp. 716, 735–38 (S.D.N.Y.
1990). Plaintiffs argued that there were substantial differences between the Second Circuit
and the agency with respect to a number of other issues, but Judge Sand found that these
gaps were not demonstrated to have enough of an impact on the adjudication of cases to
justify class-wide relief. See id. at 743.
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argument that the SSA was only required to address circuit court law at the
administrative level when the court’s holding was squarely inconsistent
with agency policy.301 Instead, Judge Sand recognized that court decisions
may add to, or elaborate on, policies and that these holdings are binding on
the agency.302
By the time of Judge Sand’s second ruling in Stieberger v. Sullivan303
(Stieberger III), the SSA had been in retreat for a number of years. With
the end of the Reagan administration and President Bush’s emphasis on a
kinder and gentler nation,304 the SSA was outwardly looking to mend
fences with the courts and to put the legacy of the Reagan years behind
it.305 In 1992, the SSA agreed to settle Stieberger by issuing a manual of
Second Circuit case law on disability to be distributed to all adjudicators
responsible for cases within the circuit.306
The Stieberger settlement marked the close of a decade of remarkable
acrimony and conflict between the Second Circuit and the SSA. The
cleanup continued for years afterward as injunctions and settlements in
class actions required the agency to basically readjudicate a decade’s worth
of benefit denials.307 The SSA came to terms with the treating physician
rule by issuing a set of comprehensive regulations on the evaluation of
medical evidence, thus putting an end to the game of cat and mouse around
the issue of what exactly is the agency’s policy.308 The interlude
demonstrates the ability of federal courts to act as an effective check on
agencies not simply by exercising judicial review of an individual agency
action, but by responding to a massive shift in administrative direction
301. See id. at 729–30.
302. See id. Judge Sand also rejected the process that the agency had developed during
the course of the litigation for dealing with acquiescence generally through the issuance of
Acquiescence Rulings, finding that in most of the cases that the agency lost at the circuit
level, it had determined that the court’s holding did not conflict with agency policy, leading
to the implausible conclusion that the SSA had simply misapplied its own policies in case
after case that it had defended to the appellate level. See id. at 751–57.
303. 738 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
304. See President George H.W. Bush, Inaugural Address at the West Front of the United
States Capitol (Jan. 20, 1989) (“America is never wholly herself unless she is engaged in
high moral principle. We as a people have such a purpose today. It is to make kinder the
face of the Nation and gentler the face of the world.”).
305. See R. Shep Melnick, Entrepreneurial Litigation: Advocacy Coalitions and
Strategies in the Fragmented American Welfare State, in REMAKING AMERICA: DEMOCRACY
AND PUBLIC POLICY IN AN AGE OF INEQUALITY 51, 60–61 (Joe Soss et al. eds., 2007) (noting
that the SSA officials conceded that they had created a “nightmare in the courts” and were
left “deeply chagrined” (quoting Interview by Larry DeWitt with Rhonda Davis, Soc. Sec.
Admin., in Baltimore, Md. (Feb. 5, 1996))).
306. See Stieberger v. Sullivan (Stieberger IV), 792 F. Supp. 1376, 1378–79 (S.D.N.Y.
1992); see also ERKULWATER, supra note 250, at 147–48. The Stieberger settlement also
called for the reopening and readjudication of tens of thousands of claims that the agency
had denied. See id.; see also Robert Pear, U.S. to Reconsider Denial of Benefits to Many
Disabled, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/19/us/us-toreconsider-denial-of-benefits-to-many-disabled.html?pagewanted=all
[https://perma.cc/7QZH-VCDT].
307. See, e.g., Dixon v. Shalala, 54 F.3d 1019 (2d Cir. 1995); New York v. Sullivan, 906
F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1990); City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1984).
308. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (2016).
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implemented through both formal and informal means that transformed the
administration of an entire program. While courts across the country were
involved in producing this result, no circuit was more engaged than the
Second Circuit, evidenced by the stream of decisions involving panels
consisting of members of the entire court, with key decisions written by
many members of the court.309 This leadership should not be surprising,
given the groundbreaking framework established by Second Circuit in
Kerner at the outset of the disability benefit programs.
Social Security disability cases are justice at the retail level. They are
fact intensive and technical, and generally do not raise the kinds of legal
issues and analysis that attract most able attorneys to the federal bench.310
Moreover, the principle of judicial deference to administrative agencies
easily could lead courts to apply only a light touch to judicial review.
Nonetheless, these cases are critical to people in need. They are important
to people’s lives. The Second Circuit has long recognized this reality,
rolled up its sleeves, and dug into the record in ways that have had a major
impact.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we attempted to illustrate a variety of issues through
which the Second Circuit has advanced social justice. This diversity,
reflective of the rich legal and social communities in which the Second
Circuit sits, is in itself a strength. But the deeper significance of the Second
Circuit’s jurisprudence is its nuance and sensitivity to fundamental power
inequality, illustrated by the case law discussed herein. In 1951, Chief
Judge Learned Hand captured the Second Circuit’s tradition with brevity
and eloquence: “If we are to keep our democracy, there must be one
commandment: Thou shalt not ration justice.”311 We look forward to the
circuit continuing to break new ground as it dispenses justice in its
considered and thoughtful fashion.

309. See, e.g., Sullivan, 906 F.2d 910 (Kaufman, J.); Schisler v. Bowen (Schisler II), 851
F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1988) (Winter, J.); Hidalgo v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1987)
(Cardamone, J.); Stieberger v. Heckler (Stieberger II), 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986) (Newman,
J.); Dixon v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1102 (2d Cir. 1986) (Kearse, J.), vacated sub nom. Bowen v.
Dixon, 482 U.S. 922 (1987); Heckler 742 F.2d 729 (Newman, J.); De Leon v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 734 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1984) (Oakes, J.).
310. Through the years there have been proposals to create specialized Social Security
courts, thus removing Social Security cases from the jurisdiction of general Article III
courts. See Paul R. Verkuil & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review
of Social Security Disability Cases, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 731 (2003) (recommending an
Article I judicial review process with limited review by the circuit courts of appeals); see
also Robert E. Rains, A Specialized Court for Social Security?: A Critique of Recent
Proposals, 15 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1 (1987).
311. Learned Hand, Thou Shalt Not Ration Justice, 9 LEGAL AID BRIEF CASE, Apr. 1951,
at 3, 5.

